The influence and intelligence activities carried out by Iran outside its borders are no longer just a regional security problem concerning the Middle East. In recent years, investigations conducted in the UK, Germany, France, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and other European countries regarding individuals linked to the IRGC, espionage networks, religious-ideological influence mechanisms, and persons serving the interests of foreign states show that Tehran is implementing a long-term and systematic influence strategy in Europe.
Iran recruits individuals of Azerbaijani origin living in various countries for espionage
One of the notable directions of this strategy is the attempt to use Azerbaijanis and individuals of Azerbaijani origin living in various countries for Iran’s geopolitical interests. Recent events show that Tehran is not only influencing its own citizens but also trying to bring citizens of other countries under its influence and recruit them for intelligence activities. This once again confirms that the warnings Azerbaijan has been voicing for years are, in fact, related to the security of all of Europe.
The latest such incident was recorded in Cyprus in July 2026.
“The Jerusalem Post” reports that Rashad Sultanov, a citizen of the UK and Azerbaijan, was detained in Cyprus on charges of collecting information about the “RAF Akrotiri” military base and passing that information to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
According to information released by the London police, the dual British-Azerbaijani citizen was arrested in Cyprus on suspicion of passing information about the British airbase on the Mediterranean island to the IRGC.
The statement says that 44-year-old Rashad Sultanov, from Islington in North London, was arrested by Cypriot authorities on July 17 and remains in custody as extradition proceedings continue.
British police have described this case as the first investigation conducted abroad under the National Security Act.
“The Jerusalem Post” recalls that some time ago, the IRGC threatened to attack any British military base used by US forces in military operations against Iran.
Iran’s old strategy in a new geography
Iran’s establishment of influence networks in various countries through religious and ideological platforms is not a new phenomenon. For many years, Tehran has been trying to gain influence in various countries through religious centers, public associations, media resources, and personal connections. The goal is to collect information from these individuals, influence public opinion, and, if necessary, use them in intelligence or other operations.
Recent investigations by Western security agencies show that this activity is not limited to Iranian citizens. Tehran also tries to use dual citizens, diaspora representatives, and individuals living in various countries. The fact that the names of individuals of Azerbaijani origin have been mentioned in espionage investigations in Europe in recent months shows that the geography of this model is expanding.
Azerbaijan is one of the countries that has been facing this threat for many years. In recent years, the State Security Service of Azerbaijan has conducted numerous operations against individuals accused of cooperating with Iranian special services. According to official reports, individuals accused of espionage, high treason, and carrying out tasks for a foreign state have been arrested, and court decisions have been issued in a number of cases. These facts reveal that Iran is attempting to form an agent network in Azerbaijan.
The greatest threat is to Europe itself
This activity by Iran primarily poses a risk to the national security of European states. This concerns Iran’s attempts to form agent networks on European territory, organize within various communities, and infiltrate security systems.
Risks such as espionage, terror preparations, foreign influence operations, and radicalization are primarily a problem for the law enforcement and security agencies of European countries.
The Rashad Sultanov case is notable in this very context. According to the charges, Iran tried to use an individual of Azerbaijani origin living in Europe to collect information about a strategic military facility. If these allegations are confirmed in court, it could set an important precedent that Iran’s influence and intelligence networks are now directly targeting the national security of European states.
What is an Iran-leaning religious network, whose activities were terminated in Azerbaijan, doing at the German Foreign Ministry?
If there are individuals operating under Iranian influence in any country, they should be assessed as a potential threat to the national security of those states in the future.
Against the backdrop of what is happening, the approach recently demonstrated by Germany raises certain questions. On one hand, European countries voice their concerns about Iranian spy networks, individuals linked to the IRGC, and foreign influence operations; on the other hand, some individuals in Germany who promote Iranian narratives and are linked to Tehran are accepted on various political and diplomatic platforms, and their claims regarding Azerbaijan are heard.
The fact that representatives of an Iran-leaning religious network, whose activities were terminated in Azerbaijan, were recently received at the country’s Foreign Ministry raises serious questions about Berlin’s approach.
The point is that Germany provides opportunities to live and operate not only for traitors who targeted Azerbaijan but also for representatives of a religious network that is under Iranian influence and acts under the control and instructions of Iranian special services. It is interesting that Berlin is not aware of what dangers this could pose to the country. German law enforcement agencies should consider that individuals who have served Iran’s interests and chosen the path of treason against their homeland, Azerbaijan, could betray their host country, Germany, at any moment.
It should be noted that work was being carried out to ensure the operation of this network, called the “Muslim Brotherhood” movement, as a wing of Hezbollah in Azerbaijan. This network had planned to carry out a coup d’état in Azerbaijan through terror and establish a sharia state. However, due to the vigilance of the relevant authorities and timely measures taken, these plans failed, the network was dismantled, and its activities were terminated.
Now, the remnants of this network are going door-to-door to official instances of European countries, trying to form an opinion that religious freedoms are allegedly being violated in Azerbaijan. In reality, the goal is to legitimize and expand their activities in those countries and increase their influence.
Just recently, during President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Germany, one of the traitors who followed Azerbaijani officials and intended to commit a provocation, Alamdar Bunyadov, is of this type.
He also claimed that he received asylum in Germany because his rights were allegedly violated in Azerbaijan. However, it is known to everyone that the “Muslim Brotherhood” movement acts according to the dictates and interests of Iran. It is for this very reason that Azerbaijan’s law enforcement agencies overturned the plans of this movement, and some individuals belonging to the Iranian network left the country and found asylum in Germany and other places.
The question arises: why does the German government embrace this network, which is under the control of Iranian special services, and why are they received and heard at the Foreign Ministry?
If these elements commit a terrorist act in Germany tomorrow based on instructions from Iran, who will be responsible for this? Certainly not Azerbaijan, but the German government itself…
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Before the eyes of German special services, people under Iranian control are building a new network. Instead of preventing this, the German Foreign Ministry receives and listens to them.
It is also known that Iran creates cells consisting of Azerbaijanis in various countries—from Europe to Georgia. It is not that difficult to understand what they will be used for in the future.
European countries, especially Germany, must assess this real threat adequately and take effective measures. Otherwise, they will face unpleasant situations with dire consequences, and they will bear the responsibility for it themselves.
Azerbaijan’s warnings
Investigations conducted in recent months regarding spy networks exposed in Europe and Iran’s foreign influence networks show that the warnings Azerbaijan has been voicing for years have not been unfounded. The Rashad Sultanov case and other similar incidents prove once again that Iran is trying to recruit some individuals of Azerbaijani origin living in Europe for intelligence and surveillance activities.
Today, this issue has gone beyond the level of Azerbaijan-Iran relations. Iran is now threatening Europe’s security with individuals who have betrayed Azerbaijan. This is about Europe protecting its own security system from foreign influences, in this case, specifically from Iran. If Iran has the ability to recruit individuals living in European countries to collect information about military facilities, carry out influence operations, or engage in intelligence activities, this should primarily worry the national security agencies of those countries.
In such a situation, the main question is not what Azerbaijan says, but what conclusions European capitals will draw from these warnings. Especially leading European states like Germany must resolve the contradiction between security policy and political dialogue and assess the access of Iranian influence networks to official platforms more sensitively. Only then will it be possible to prevent the influence and agent infrastructure that Iran is trying to build in Europe and ensure security reliably.